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I. Executive Summary 
 
This review of preventative controls for fraud, waste, and abuse in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), administered by the Department of Social Services (DSS), was self-initiated by the State 
Inspector General (SIG) as part of a broader statewide review of preventative fraud, waste, and abuse 
management controls of major benefit programs in State agencies.  The federal government’s most recent 
national SNAP improper payment error rate was 3.4%.  This represented an estimated $2.6 billion in improper 
payments nationally, which placed SNAP on the federal government’s “high-error” program list.  In Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2014, SNAP provided $1.2 billion in benefit payments to 395,000 South Carolina households (834,000 
individuals), with a substantially more favorable payment error rate of 1.75% compared to the national average.  
Further, the nationwide average SNAP administrative cost was $27.73 monthly per household, and, again, 
South Carolina compared favorably at $14.38, which was the second lowest nationally.   
Clearly, DSS has much to be proud of in its SNAP process and fraud, waste, and abuse controls.  Nevertheless, 
over the past decade a trend has emerged led by seven states emphasizing an increased level of effort using 
increased preventative controls, primarily pre-certification investigations coupled with increased analytics and 
automation.  South Carolina’s preventative controls rely on manual procedures by eligibility workers operating 
a variety of data base programs to validate or analytically assess SNAP applications or recertifications.  This has 
proven, with statistical sampling, to be 98.25% effective, yet the 1.75% payment error rate created an estimated 
$19 million in improper payments annually.  Both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and the 
SIG’s small sampling of cases depicted errors that were largely preventable and more a function of an eligibility 
worker human error rather than sophisticated recipient fraud schemes.  The direction to move to a higher level 
of effectiveness is through increased automation and analytics to literally approve applications with a minimum 
of DSS employee involvement, thus allowing eligibility workers and pre-certification investigators to devote 
their time to more closely examine applications “flagged” due to high risk indicators of fraud or errors.   
This is not a criticism of DSS, but rather, just identifying the next logical step in a continuous improvement 
management process, which has proven to be effective in other states and consistent with federal guidance of 
preventative efforts being the most effective anti-fraud strategy.  Actually, it is likely more effective to not be 
the first to pioneer a new strategy because later entrants can benefit from lessons learned to minimize waste and 
smooth out implementation.     
Given DSS is currently implementing a major change initiative, this SNAP opportunity likely will not be a 
priority in the strategic plan queue.  However, the states already having implemented these SNAP changes 
demonstrated a successful incremental approach of piloting to test and verify cost/effectiveness prior to a 
broader expansion.  The DSS has already demonstrated a forward leaning approach by regionalizing its benefit 
integrity resources to standardize operations and increase personnel’s capabilities.  Thinking now on the future 
can identify opportunities to potentially blend this strategic idea into other DSS initiatives or be prepared to 
obtain Federal resources/grants as the federal government continues to push states to increase their fraud 
prevention efforts by using preventative controls through technology and pre-certification investigations.   
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II. Background 
 
A. Predicate 
This review was self-initiated by the State Inspector General (SIG) as part of a broader statewide review of 
preventative fraud, waste, and abuse management controls on major benefit programs at state agencies.  The 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), administered by the Department of Social Services (DSS), 
provided $1.2 billion in benefit payments to 395,000 South Carolina households (834,000 individuals) in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2014.  Over the past 10 years there has been a paradigm shift away from paying benefits first, 
followed by chasing down fraud and abuse after the fact – a process known as “pay and chase.”  History has 
shown post benefit payment investigations required sizable resources, lengthy due process timeframes, and 
problematic ability to recoup fraud, waste, and abuse dollars.  The new model emphasizes agency preventative 
management controls to stop fraud, abuse, and waste before it begins.  In the case of SNAP, preventative 
controls were mainly in the area of validating the accuracy of enrollment application data to ensure the recipient 
qualifies for SNAP benefits.  
B. Scope & Objectives 
This review’s scope and objectives were: 
• Assess SNAP’s preventative management controls for fraud, waste, and abuse; 
 
• Identify SNAP preventative management control best practices; and 
 
• Identify opportunities to improve SNAP management controls to cost/effectively mitigate risks of fraud, 
waste, and abuse.   
Reviews by the SIG are conducted in accordance with professional standards set forth by the Association of 
Inspectors General, often referred to as the “Green Book.” 
C. SNAP Overview 
SNAP benefits are intended for low income individuals who meet certain criteria including income, 
resources/assets, employment requirements, and immigrant status.  In 2014, 46 million individuals nationally 
from 22 million households participated in SNAP and received just under $70 billion in benefits.   
The SNAP Program operates under a partnership between individual states and the federal government.  The 
federal government administers SNAP through its Department of Agriculture, which promulgates regulations 
and assures states’ compliance by providing guidance and monitoring states’ activity.  In addition, the federal 
government funds 100% of the benefits and approximately 50% of each state’s administrative costs.  State 
responsibilities include:  determining eligibility; calculating benefits; administering the day-to-day operations of 
the program; and funding 50% of the administrative cost.  Eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse in SNAP is a 
joint responsibility with the states having the responsibility of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting recipient 
benefit fraud, while the federal government focuses on pursuing fraudulent activity by retailers. 
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Eligibility and benefit levels are determined on the basis of the household.  Most applicants must meet both 
gross and net income tests.  A household’s gross income cannot exceed 130% of the federal income poverty 
guideline ($1,276 monthly for a one-person household; and $4,430 for an eight-person household).  The 
household’s net income, after allowable deductions, cannot exceed 100% of the federal income poverty 
guideline ($981 for a one-person household; and $3,408 for an eight-person household).  Eligibility can 
automatically be obtained if the household is already approved for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  Additionally, all members of a household cannot have total 
countable resources/assets in excess exceed $2,250 ($3,250 if the household includes one or more disabled 
members or members age 60 or over).      
Benefit amounts, referred to as allotments, are based on income and household size.  The federal government 
provides a table of the maximum allotment for various household sizes (from $194 for a one-person household 
to $1,169 for an eight-person household).  The table is based on “The Thrifty Food Plan” – a model-based, 
market basket of foods representing a nutritious diet at minimal cost.  SNAP guidelines expect recipients to 
spend 30% of their net income on food and that amount is deducted from the table’s maximum allotment to 
arrive at the benefit amount provided to the recipient.  In FY 2014, South Carolina’s average benefits were 
$123.40 per person and $260.56 per household, compared to the national averages of $125.48 per person and 
$264.88 per household.   
Once approved, SNAP households must apply for recertification after varying periods of time.  South Carolina 
utilizes a six month recertification period, except households where all members are either elderly or disabled 
with no earned income.  Those are allowed a 24 month certification period.     
III. DSS’s SNAP Process 
 
A. Application and Recertification 
Virtually all SNAP applications and recertifications were completed online or via mailed in forms.  DSS 
scanned mailed applications and they were combined with the online applications, which appeared to the initial 
DSS eligibility worker in an electronic queue.  The eligibility worker verified the following:  identity; 
residency; social security numbers; household composition; disability; alien eligibility; gross non-exempt 
income; shelter/utility expenses; medical expenses; the legal obligation for child support along with actual 
payments; work hours for able-bodied adults subject to a time limit; and any other factors determined to be 
questionable.  Verifications were accomplished through documentation furnished by applicants and through 
confirming the accuracy of the information using a variety of electronic resources from private vendors and the 
state/federal government.  An interview was required upon the initial application and annually thereafter, but, in 
most cases, the interview was by telephone.     
If the eligibility worker approved the initial application or recertification, the DSS system calculated the benefit 
amount, and also allowed the worker to efficiently generate a notification letter mailed to the recipient.  If more 
information was needed, the eligibility worker attempted to call the recipient, which if unsuccessful, a letter 
requesting the missing information was processed and mailed.   
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During FY 2015, DSS received 285,433 initial applications of which 173,482 (61%) were approved.  
Recertifications for 242,679 households yielded 205,174 (85%) approvals.  The 149,456 denials of initial 
applications and recertifications were denied for the following reasons: failed to complete an interview (38.5%); 
failed to furnish information (32.6%); income exceeded the limits (19.1%); household composition (4.9%); drug 
convictions, fraud disqualifications, or undocumented aliens (1.2%); and voluntarily withdrawal (3.7%). 
B. Benefits Integrity Program Investigations 
The Benefit Integrity Program (BI) assured the integrity of SNAP through investigations to ascertain if 
eligibility and benefits were correctly determined according to federal and state regulations.  DSS undertook a 
major change in its SNAP integrity efforts by regionalizing SNAP investigations in May, 2014, where 
previously investigations were conducted by county offices.  Four regional offices were created and staffed 
consisting of 16 to 20 benefit integrity claims specialists and two supervisors per region. 
Case referrals to BI emanate from four sources:  DSS eligibility workers (54.2%); internal DSS assurance 
reviews (19.9%); public complaints (14.5%); and other (11.4%).  During FY 2015, case referrals totaled 12,798 
with 6,840 sustained (55%) and 5,558 (45%) unfounded.  Of the 6,840 sustained cases, 3,189 (47%) were 
determined to be Intentional Program Violations (IPV), where the recipient provided false information with 
deceitful intent.  Since the regional effort began in May, 2014, case volume has increased; FY 2016 increased 
35% from FY 2015. 
Fifteen closed BI investigations from the previous twelve months were selected and reviewed by the SIG for 
quality and timeliness of investigations, which were determined to be adequate.  All but one case was sustained 
and overpayments were determined totaling $61,858, which ranged from $150 to $22,947 per case.  Three cases 
were classified as agency error; seven were classified as inadvertent client error; and four were determined to be 
intentional program violations resulting in disqualifications of the individuals involved.  Interestingly, the errors 
in these 14 sustained investigations should, in the SIG’s view, have been identified by the initial eligibility 
worker or at least identified as a “red flag” to be pursued with additional follow-up as illustrated by these 
examples: 
• The applicant answered affirmatively she had a felony drug conviction (a disqualification), and did so on 
three subsequent recertifications, yet her benefits continued to be approved.  
 
• Five cases depicted financially questionable situations raising “red flags” without further investigation, 
such as expenses equaling or exceeding reported income.  
These two examples denote two types of errors:  obvious errors an eligibility worker had the capability to 
identify; and errors an eligibility worker could not determine from initially provided data but there were 
questionable financial situations raising “red flags” warranting further review.  Managers and eligibility workers 
noted differing directives over the years on how to address “red flag” suspicions.  Some prior managers gave 
directives to not question applicants on “red flag” type situations and just approve.  Currently, eligibility 
workers are instructed to follow up on “red flags,” but eligibility workers’ capabilities, time, and ability to 
address using desk audit techniques inhibit fully resolving many “red flags.”  
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The BI case results were used as a feedback mechanism to the eligibility workers, which then triggered 
mandatory performance improvement plans for underperforming eligibility workers.  This has helped address 
inconsistency with eligibility workers.   
C. Adjudication Process for Sustained Investigative Determinations 
Sustained determinations fall into three categories: client error; agency error; or intentional program violation 
(IPV).  IPVs result in disqualification from SNAP participation.  In cases involving an IPV, states had the 
option to follow an administrative process or refer the case for prosecution through the courts.  The 
administrative process involved an Administrative Disqualification Hearing (ADH) before an impartial hearing 
officer whose job was to determine if there was an intent to defraud.  The amount of any overpayment was not 
an issue in the hearing, only whether or not there was an intent to fraudulently obtain benefits.  An individual 
may elect to waive their right to an ADH and be disqualified from SNAP participation.  Decisions to prosecute 
through the court system varied from state to state depending on state laws and the availability of prosecutorial 
resources.         
In FY 2015, DSS scheduled 1,210 ADHs resulting in 591 upheld determinations, 7 reversed determinations, 
with 612 participants waiving their rights to an ADH.  DSS reported 60 referrals for prosecution resulting in 60 
convictions.  DSS generally referred cases for prosecution involving overpayment amounts exceeding $2,500. 
D. Debt Collection Analysis 
DSS reported a balance of $61 million in claims established from overpayment of SNAP benefits at December 
31, 2015.  During calendar year 2015, $13.9 million in new claims were established and collections totaled 
$12.2 million.  Several means of collection were used with the vast majority (90%) coming through 
recoupments or offsets against continuing SNAP benefits or income tax refunds.  A breakdown of the 2015 
collections is as follows: 
      Cash or Equivalents              $     870,387 
  Return of EBT Card Balances            6,223 
  Collection through Federal Tax Offsets    3,164,361 
  Recoupment/Offsets Continuing Benefits    7,926,878 
  Expungements          110,766 
  Claims Written Off          134,473 
         TOTAL              $ 12,213,088 
 
DSS wrote off claims in three circumstances: claim amounts were less than $25; all adult members of a 
household were deceased; and no adult member of a household could be located.  Otherwise, DSS continued 
collection attempts indefinitely, and a current accounts receivable aging report included amounts from as far 
back as FY 2006, but 80% of the current balance was from the last five years. 
In analyzing the accounts receivable data, the SIG observed the amount of claims established per benefits paid 
had tripled since 2006.  DSS suggested its increased integrity efforts have resulted in the identification of more 
potential claims for investigation.     
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Although SNAP benefits were entirely funded by federal dollars, the states were allowed to retain percentages 
of certain SNAP overpayment collections:  35% of SNAP collections resulting from IPV determinations or 
fraud; and 20% of collections resulting from inadvertent household errors, commonly referred to as client 
errors.  In South Carolina a state proviso allowed DSS to retain the collections and dictated a portion be 
distributed to the local county offices for emergency and program operations.  DSS reported the FY 2015 
retained collections totaled $1.7 million with half applied to the cost of the regional Benefit Integrity effort, and 
the other half disbursed to the county DSS offices under the Project “Fighting Abuse Investigative 
Recoupment” (FAIR) Program.  Project FAIR provided a flexible source of funds under the discretion of county 
directors to fund client services or needs. 
   
E. Quality Control Review 
The federal government required states to perform annual Quality Control (QC) reviews of their SNAP 
eligibility and benefit determinations.  States were required to review both active cases (benefits currently being 
paid) and negative cases (denial, suspension or termination of benefits).  The QC reviews measured the validity 
of SNAP cases to determine each state’s SNAP Program payment error rate, as well as the national payment 
error rate – a weighted average of the states’ rates.  The national payment error rate was 3.4% for FY 2013, 
which represented an estimated $2.6 billion in improper payments.  Due to the large dollar amount of possible 
improper payments, the Federal Office of Management and Budget placed SNAP on its list of high-error 
programs.   
The DSS’s FY 2013 QC review resulted in a 1.75% payment error rate, which was validated by the federal 
government through testing of DSS’s QC review.  The 1.75% error rate extrapolated to $21.6 million in 
overpayments and $2.6 million in underpayments for net overpayment of $19 million.  Errors were categorized 
as:  non-financial variances (household composition; work requirements; and citizenship); income variances; 
resource/assets variances; and deduction variances.  The majority of errors were income related (63%), followed 
by non-financial variances (23%), and deduction variances (14%).  Errors were attributed to either agency 
errors (69%) or client errors (31%).  Most of the errors were determined from the desk audit (50%), followed by 
the household interview (30%), with the remaining discovered from collateral contacts (20%).  DSS received a 
$1.6 million Federal bonus for the most improved error rate for negative cases for FY 2013. 
F. Administrative Costs 
The federal government provided approximately 50% of the states’ administrative costs.  Administrative costs 
varied among states due to a number of factors including participation levels, types of issuance systems, degree 
of automation, and level of fraud control.   
The nationwide average administrative cost was $27.73 monthly per household.  South Carolina had the second 
lowest administrative cost at $14.38 monthly per household, while Florida had the lowest at $7.78.  The U. S. 
Virgin Islands, with the lowest number of households (12,478), had the highest cost of $76.56, followed by 
California at $67.22.   
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G. Summary Analysis 
In a data rich environment, the core metric for success in management controls for fraud, waste, and abuse, 
which includes both preventative and post controls, was a state’s payment error rate.  The national payment 
error rate was 3.4%, and South Carolina’s 1.75% rate compared favorably, and was the 14th best nationally.  
Through statistical sampling, DSS’s efforts were 98.25% effective, yet the 1.75% error rate created an estimated 
$19 million in improper payments annually.  Both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and the 
SIG’s small sampling of cases depicted errors that were largely preventable and more a function of an eligibility 
worker’s human error or a lack of capacity to follow-up on logical “red flags,” rather than due to sophisticated 
recipient fraud schemes.  Also noteworthy, DSS’s monthly administrative cost per household of $14.38 
compared favorably to the nationwide average $27.73, and was next to the lowest in the nation.     
IV. SNAP Best Practices for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse 
 
A. Trend Towards Pre-Certification Investigations 
Clearly, DSS has much to be proud of in its SNAP process and fraud, waste, and abuse controls.  Nevertheless, 
over the past decade a trend has emerged led by seven states emphasizing a higher level of effort using 
preventative controls, primarily pre-certification investigations coupled with increased analytics and 
automation.   
Based on the federal government’s annual SNAP State Activity Report, pre-certification investigations have 
been increasing over the past decade.  In the most recent report (FY 2014), most of the pre-certification 
investigations were conducted by seven states with the remaining states conducting only a few or none, as is the 
case with South Carolina and 19 other states.  These seven states were New York, Pennsylvania, Florida, 
Michigan, Minnesota, California, and Washington, where pre-certification investigations averaged 75% of all 
investigations. 
The GAO determined preventative efforts to be the most efficient and effective anti-fraud strategy.  The most 
recent GAO SNAP Performance Audit (2014) reported states were still experiencing difficulties in using some 
of the fraud detection tools.  Stretched resources contributed to the states’ inability to fully utilize the tools, and 
some tools had not proven to be very successful, such as monitoring social media sites to detect benefit 
trafficking.  Some states suggested the federal incentive structure should be redesigned to better support their 
fraud prevention efforts, noting the current structure was directed entirely toward collecting overpayments.  It 
was noted the incentive structure could not be changed without federal legislative approval but, in the short-
term, the federal government planned to offer grants to states to assist with preventative fraud detection efforts. 
B. States Implementing a Pre-Certification Strategy 
 
1. Pennsylvania 
The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (PA-DHS) handled SNAP processing, but the Pennsylvania 
Inspector General’s Office (PA-OIG) conducted all investigations.  Pennsylvania has committed to the strategy 
of pre-certification investigation by deploying 70 investigators throughout the state.  Cases were referred by 
PA-DHS eligibility workers based on suspicious information potentially in error or fraudulent.  Each 
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investigator handled from 40 to 60 investigations per month, and 50% of the investigations resulted in a 
sustained determination.  That percentage of sustained determinations has remained consistent as more 
investigators were added through the years.   
Other than the common online tools, the investigators did not use any special databases or services, but did 
fieldwork, such as talked to neighbors and checked school records.  The applicant was rarely contacted.  The 
investigations operated on a five day turnaround to provide the PA-DHS eligibility worker their findings, who 
then made the final decision on approving or denying benefit applications.       
The PA-OIG also had 40 post-certification investigators who handled IPV cases and referrals for prosecution.  
The PA-OIG investigative efforts had a positive cost/benefit of $87 million last year, which represented $13 
saved for every $1 spent on investigations. 
2. Michigan 
The Office of the Inspector General, Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MI-OIG), provided 
investigative efforts for many benefit programs, to include 872,000 SNAP households.  The MI-OIG’s 
emphasis on pre-certification investigations started in 2000 with a pilot in one county, where benefit workers 
referred applicants based on “red flag” indicators to the investigators prior to awarding benefits (see Appendix 
A).  The pilot was so successful it has now been expanded to every Michigan County.  The MI-OIG now has 
100 investigators located throughout the state performing pre-certification investigations.   
During FY 2014, the MI-OIG conducted 44,097 investigations; 36,441 pre-certification (83%) and 7,656 post-
certification (17%).  Pre-certification investigations required a 10 day maximum turnaround time and yielded a 
55% positive determination rate.  Savings generated by preventing the payment of ineligible benefits grew from 
$30.3 million in FY 2011 to $93.6 million in FY 2014 as the number of pre-certification investigators increased.  
The program was currently identifying $261 of potential fraud for every hour of investigative effort.  
Pre-certification investigations were supported with increased analytical tools.  The MI-OIG used a number of 
similar online verification tools as DSS, but also contracted for other private sector databases and verification 
tools, such as:   
• An application providing a recipient’s exact latitude and longitude each time the recipient accesses the 
Michigan Health and Human Services website.  A number of investigative reports were generated, such 
as flagging multiple recipients emanating from the same location.   
 
• A private sector data base with enhanced capabilities, with the particular benefit of including the date 
and source of data to better assess the value of the information.   
 
• An application used for keyword searches of social media sites helps assess recipient information and 
relationships.   
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3. Florida 
 
The review identified Florida as perhaps the state with the most developed preventative fraud, waste, and abuse 
capabilities.  Florida has combined automation and analytics with pre-certification investigations for maximum 
benefit.   
 
In 2005, Florida embarked on the development of a public assistance “self-service customer portal” where 
recipients can apply and renew benefits, update information, and make certain requests such as for replacement 
electronic benefit cards (EBT).  While the applicant entered the required information, an automated process 
queried various verification resources in the background to validate the applicant’s identity and information 
furnished.  If all required information was validated within set parameters, the client’s application or 
recertification was approved and the customer notified while online without involving an eligibility worker.  If 
there was missing information or the automated verification process determined the client’s information was 
outside of set parameters, the case was put into a queue for an eligibility worker to review with specific 
instructions to resolve the issues identified.  It took many years to fully develop this system, but it has resulted 
in increased customer convenience and cost savings from closing down entire eligibility processing centers.  
This certainly contributed to Florida having nationally the lowest SNAP administrative cost of $7.78 monthly 
per household ($ 27.73 average nationally).   
 
Florida’s initiatives expanded as a result of its Legislature creating “The Medicaid and Public Assistance Task 
Force” to increase program effectiveness and develop initiatives to prevent, detect, and prosecute Medicaid and 
other public assistance fraud.  The Task Force commissioned a study to estimate the amount of fraud in SNAP 
benefit applications (See Appendix B).  The study determined a 7.5% incidence of fraud in their sample with 
75% of the incidences resulting from non-reporting or under-reporting of income.  At the time, 32% of Florida’s 
investigations were pre-certification, yet these investigations had positive results in 87% of cases as compared 
to 13% for post-certification cases.  The study’s recommendations included a focus on computer comparisons of 
recipient income and increasing the number of pre-certification investigations to move away from the post-
certification “pay-and-chase” system.   
Florida has 65 pre-certification investigators located throughout the state.  Cases were developed from direct 
referrals from its “self-service customer portal” and eligibility workers’ requests based on suspicions of false or 
inaccurate information.  The investigators had ten days to perform an investigation and reach a determination.  
Florida’s pre-certification investigations prevented the payment of $25-30 million in fraudulent benefits 
annually. 
V. Conclusion 
The DSS SNAP payment error rate was 1.75%, which was 45% better than the national payment error rate of 
3.4% and ranked 14th best nationally.  Also relevant, DSS’s administrative cost was $14.38 monthly per 
household, and, again, favorably compared to the national average of $27.73 and ranked second lowest 
nationally.  However, it is not too soon for DSS to look to the future to plan for a higher level of 
cost/effectiveness by increasing preventative fraud controls through automation and analytics coupled with pre-
certification investigations.  This is not a criticism, but rather the next logical step in a continuous improvement 
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management process.  Actually, it is likely more effective to not be the first to pioneer a new strategy because 
later entrants can benefit from lessons learned to minimize waste and smooth out implementation.     
Given DSS is currently implementing a major change initiative, this SNAP opportunity likely should not be a 
priority in the strategic planning queue.  However, the states already having implemented these SNAP changes 
demonstrated a successful incremental approach of piloting to test and verify cost/effectiveness prior to a 
broader expansion.  The DSS has already demonstrated a forward leaning approach by regionalizing its benefit 
integrity resources to standardize operations, increase integrity, and increase personnel capabilities.  Thinking 
now on the future can identify opportunities to potentially blend this strategic idea into other DSS initiatives or 
be prepared to obtain Federal resources/grants as the federal government continues to push states to become 
more proactive using preventative controls through technology and pre-certification investigations.   
VI. Findings & Recommendations 
Finding #1:  DSS controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse were substantially better than the national average 
as depicted by a 1.75% payment error rate compared to the 3.4% national rate.   
Finding #2:  DSS controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse have an opportunity to improve with a long-term 
strategy emphasizing automation and analytics coupled with pre-certification investigations. 
Recommendation #1a:  DSS should consider piloting pre-certification investigations using existing 
regional benefit integrity staff currently conducting post-certification investigations.   
Recommendation #1b:  DSS should consider fixing responsibility with one manager as a collateral 
duty to learn from other states using automation and analytics with pre-certification best practices and 
work this initiative into DSS’s long-term strategic plans.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: 
DSS’s comments on report located at link:  http://oig.sc.gov/Documents/DSS Response to Snap Review.pdf 
